by Henry Oliner

While Doug Feith in his excellent, “War and Decision” analyizes what went wrong ( and what went right) in the war on terror, he does not spare his own boss Rumsfeld or Bush. While Rumseld was brilliant at strategy and in depth thinking his personal manner antagonized a lot of people he needed to work with.

The decision to go to war was a thougthful one, with general agreement from both political parties and the advising agencies. Some errors that Feith attributes to Bush:

1. Over reliance on intelligence

Most of the case against Saddam Hussein was in the UN records, the newspapers and the history books. He was clearly circumventing the UN sanctions and weapons inspections and stood ready to continue and restart his WMD productions when the sanctions were lifted. The liklihood of Saddam soon becoming a direct threat was high.

2. Emphasis on WMD stockpiles.

By focusing on the threat of stockpiles during our presentation at the UN, the relative importance of that one factor became the sole measurement and causus belli. Other more important factors were quickly forgotten.

3. Failure to build a cohesive team

Tolerating debate during the planning phase is good. Once the decision for war is made dissenters should leave the group. Toleration of leaks and divisiveness while our troops are under fire and the Iraqis are struggling is intolerable.

Doug retells the Johnson axiom, “It is OK to be on the inside of the tent pissing out, or the outside pissing in; but do not be on the inside of the tent pissing in.”

Bush allowed way too much piss in his tent.

4. Mission creep

The purpose of the mission was to protect the United States from another attack. It was an issue of National Security. When the WMD stockpiles did not materialize, Bush’s speeches shifted to the future of Iraq and building a democracy. He should have re-emphasized the original purpose of protecting America’s security and that it involved much more than the WMD stockpiles.

His shift made it seem we were fighting for Iraqi interests and not American interests and that was the beginning of the end for public support of the war. This was his biggest mistake.

The threat was not diminished by Bush’s communication gaffes, but continuous support to finish the job was jeapordized.

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