Gideon Rose, editor of Foreign Affairs, has written a book focusing on the conclusion and post military developments of America’s wars  from WWI though the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  If How Wars End has a common theme is the need to carefully consider the consequences and costs of victory as a part of the planning of the overall campaign.

Few lenses provide the clarity of hindsight.  The failure of peace after the military victory of WWI was recognized and not repeated after WWII. But new mistakes cause the victories of WWII to degenerate into the Cold War.

The lessons of total victory did not apply to the limited actions, defined by our limited commitment, such as Korea and Vietnam.  But George H. Bush and his military advisors were strongly motivated not to repeat the many mistakes of Viet Nam.  Desert Storm was strong, decisive, devoid of political tampering and most of all, limited.  But it left a tyrant in power and did not protect us from a 9/11 from the region.

The emotions and fear of 9/11 dominated a largely unchecked effort  to eradicate all terrorist threats, whether directly responsible for 9/11 or not. But the strategic failure to plan or to competently execute a plan after Saddam’s fall left us with new lessons.

But other lessons are not in the book.  Americans are an impatient people. In war a deadline can be a disadvantage. We like our wars fast and cheap. A committed enemy can readily lose the war and win by making the peace or aftermath intolerable.  Once the troops come home we turn our television station to another channel and tend to neglect the aftermath of our actions.

Peace must take into account changing political dynamics.  Both Wilson’s and Nixon’s plans at the bargaining table were frustrated by changing political control at home.  A successful peace can require a consensus that was worn thin by the war.

When we cure one disease, we succeed in living longer and thus are able to contact another disease.  We do learn the lessons from our previous conflicts, both successes and failure. But this just creates the opportunities to confront new problems.

We have not inflicted total defeat and surrender since WWII. We now face an enemy that considers survival a victory.  We fight enemies unaligned with a nation state, and must adapt to armies without borders.

The lesson from our past conflicts was that victory was only the first step.  Now we have to find a whole new definition for what victory really is.

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