Ever since Michael Douglas’s character Gordon Gekko in the movie Wall Street declared “Greed is Good” capitalism has been cast in a sinister role that it has yet to overcome.

The movie speech was rumored to be taken from a speech given by Ivan Boesky at a college address. Boesky was indicted for insider trader, served time in jail and paid millions in fines.

Capitalism is not about greed; it is about economic self interest, and this is far more than a semantic distinction. When you take a job paying $10 an hour over the job paying only $8 an hour you are displaying economic self interest, not greed. And when you decide to take the job paying $8 an hour over the job paying $10 an hour because you like the conditions or the work at the lower paying job enough to sacrifice the higher pay you are also acting in your own economic self interest. Economics is about far more than money.

When you decide to take a steady job in a traditional workplace rather than make much more money in drugs and prostitution you are also acting in your economic self interest. It is when your economic self interest disconnects from moral and ethical considerations that it becomes greed.

The ultimate power is the power over your own destiny and environment, but power is most often considered in the control over others. Whereas economic self interest in about control over your own destiny, political self interest is about controlling others.

Capitalism is about people acting in each other’s own self interest and the society benefiting as a result. This works because achieving your self interest requires serving others.

Advanced economic theory also realized that self interest and sharing is not mutually exclusive. In “A Beautiful Mind” John Nash had a Eureka moment courting ladies at the beer hall with his college buddies. He realized that Adam Smith was wrong, or at least incomplete. He developed a theory of equilibrium in competitive game theory. Basically this meant that he realized that your best outcome was not to grab as much as you can for yourself, but that your chance of success was enhanced by assuring at least some success for your competitors. Not only are consumers’ well being enhanced by competition, but the outcome for the competitors themselves is improved.

In order to profit you have to provide a product or service some one else values. Bill Gates, Michael Dell, and Stephen Jobs are very, very wealthy because everyone values Microsoft Windows and Office, iPhones, Macs, and laptops.

Few people complain about the wealth of these techno entrepreneurs because they all provide value we understand. The same can be said of Warren Buffet.

Yet we are outraged at the fortunes made in the financial industry where record amounts of value have been destroyed while CEOs made millions in bonuses. We do not understand derivatives, collateralized debt obligations, and financial models: Apparently neither did the CEO’s and boards of the companies selling these products.

The Wall Street mess was the product of “crony capitalism” which is to capitalism what National Socialism (Nazism) is to socialism. Crony Capitalism is a perversion of the principles of capitalism that includes the freedom “for every man to make himself” to use the phrase of Abraham Lincoln. “Crony capitalism” has its roots in the mercantilist tradition of Alexander Hamilton. During our early years Hamilton saw a need for financial interests and the government to work “closely”. He favored a central bank and such “public private partnerships.”

Hamilton was strongly opposed by Jefferson who favored decentralization and saw the favoritism fostered by mercantilism and the influence such financiers could have over our government as a threat to liberty.

Fannie Mae for example was given special treatment and access to low interest funds available to no other financial institution, and exempted from both SEC and FDIC regulation, Fannie Mae lobbied Congress and plied their special regulators with large campaign contributions. Senator Chris Dodd, head of the Senate Banking Committee and then Senator Barak Obama were the two largest recipients.

But the real damage was not compromising two high profile Senators. Fannie Mae was given special privileges in order to carry out the political will of Congress to make housing affordable for people who shouldn’t buy homes. They created the hunting grounds for the unscrupulous.

Bonuses and bailout funds for Fannie Mae did not elicit near the outrage of AIG and the Wall Street banks. The public still thinks it was the ‘Gordon Gekko’ greed of Wall Street rather than the political greed of K Street.

We still blame the economic self interest instead of the political self interest. Articles decry the old capitalism and herald the new era of state capitalism. The last time we heralded state capitalism was in Italy in the 1920’s and 30’s.

Crony capitalism was not limited to Fannie Mac and Freddie Mac. There has been a revolving door between Wall Street and Washington for decades. As long as the complicated instruments served the political greed, political leaders were willing to ignore prudent financial principles and assume that the overpaid magicians knew what they were doing.

The financial scandals of the 1980’s, the S&L collapse under George H Bush, the collapse of Long Term Capital in 1998, The collapse of the high tech bubble should have been a warning that high salaries and bonuses are not synonymous with competence.

But the solution is not to promote more crony capitalism, also called state capitalism or my favorite term used in the book “Nudge” (Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein) , ‘Libertarian Paternalism’  (my vote for oxymoron of the year).

By now we should have learned that when business gets in bed with the government, somebody gets screwed.

The default belief  of our economic history of the last 100 years has been an acceptance of the dynamic growth of capitalism punctuated by excesses of market greed that have to be corrected by the singular wisdom of government regulation.

On closer examination many of those moments of market greed and excess look more like incompetent government meddling caused the problem.

During the Depression of 1929 we saw 10,000 banks collapse in the United States. Yet during that same period the number of bank failures in Canada were zero.  Was Canada spared the depression that engulfed the United States? No, but Canada was spared a regulation that prevented banks from crossing state lines.

Bending to pressure to protect local banks from encountering big business center banks, they got relief and protection from the Federal government in the restriction of interstate competition.  But that also severely limited their flexibility in dealing with a crisis, a limit that did not exist in Canada where risks were spread over larger areas and underutilized assets could be easily relocated.

Yet to respond to the bank failures that the government largely caused they created the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).  FDR opposed the FDIC because he saw it would create a sanction for reckless behavior and penalize prudently run banks.  FDR capitulated in a compromise and the FDIC began by insuring deposits for $2500 in 1934. It was raised to $5,000 in 1935, $10,000 in 1950 (Truman), $15,000 in 1966 (Johnson), $20,000 in 1968 (LBJ again), $40,000 in 1974 (Nixon), and then $100,000 under Jimmy Carter in 1980.  Bush raised it to $250,000 before he left office, but it is due to revert back to $100,000 in 2013.

Ten years after Carter raised the limit we experienced the Savings and Loans meltdown, caused by the excessive risk taking in that industry. The government again intervened and created the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) to dispose of failed thrift institutions taken over by regulators after January 1, 1989 in an orderly manner.

The FDIC created the moral hazard FDR feared. It privatized the profits and socialized the risks.  This behavior was repeated, but on steroids, with the implicit assumption of risk by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Housing was deemed a federal priority, and helping the poorer people get into housing has been a priority since Fannie Mae was created again by FDR in 1938.  But housing prices were highest and least affordable in select areas where local ordinances had restricted supply and raised prices far more than in areas were market forces prevailed.

Tax policies such as mortgage interest deductions and preferred capital gains treatment increased the demand for housing. The Community Reinvestment Act, passed under Carter but exploited under Clinton and Bush, pressured banks to make mortgage loans to less and less qualified buyers. Fannie Mae guaranteed loans, clearing the ratings agencies which had a government protected franchise; to give higher ratings than these mortgage backed securities could have conceivably obtained on the merits of their assets. This widened the market for these securities and caused even more money to be driven into the housing market from all over the world creating the bubble that had to burst.

To compound the damage the government required a mark to market rule for valuing these mortgage loans at the worst possible time; when no market existed.  The market to market rule causes valuations to go to extremes, high and low.  This caused capital to dry up and regulations required banks to rebuild capital reserves instead of making loans. Then at a time when information was critical to valuing these securities, the government suspended short selling, a critical source of such information.

During the recent financial disaster, Canada did not exhibit near the real estate collapse we did in the United States.  In Canada they had far less exposure to sub prime loans, large down payments were still required while we all but eliminated down payments for the poorest home buyers in the name of ‘compassionate conservatism’, and mortgage borrowers in Canada were still held personally liable for their loans. Canada had tougher and more prudent lending standards, but they avoided the fiasco foisted on us by well intentioned but misguided moral supremacists on the government payroll.

The government in the U.S. inflated this bubble as eagerly as any on Wall Street, but our government “had a much bigger pump”.

Seventy five years ago we could have looked to our northern neighbor and learned better behavior instead of demonizing capitalism. Today we can learn the same lesson, but again we seek to demonize the private sector for conditions created by incompetent government regulation. Wall Street clearly has its demons to account for, but its greed was enabled and often encouraged by incompetent regulations and policy that has a long history.

As we crave more government oversight we should ask who will oversee the government that has demonstrated such spectacular failure.

We mortals pride ourselves as rational beings, but we act emotionally. We get attached to previous positions, and will discount or filter evidence rather than change our minds. We read the news for confirmation rather than information.  We are so inundated with information that we rely on emotional instincts to make quick decisions.

Our first instincts are emotional and we tend to then, and only then, rationalize our first decisions. I call this emotional rationalism. Marketers understand this very well.

When you add risk into our thought process we can become even more irrational. Risk is probability plus outrage or fear. Thus the chance of a 911 attack may be small but the outrage of that act may lead us to take extreme measures to prevent such an occurrence from happening again. We spend far more political capital to prevent gun deaths than deaths from swimming pools, which are far more common.

The Age of Reason did not stop wars and hatred; it just changed the institutions that expressed them. Anti-Semitism of the church simply became anti-Semitism in the halls of education and government. Hatred towards those who opposed established faith became even more bitter when it was applied to those who opposed established norms of reason.

Academic credentialism, as distinct from intellectual depth, is not immune to emotional rationalism. Academics will become attached to their theories even when they conflict with the realities of the world they attempt to explain. The world of experience will translate to the world of theory much better than the reverse. Once someone gets a theory in their head it is hard to get them to see the world objectively again.

Thus academics descended on Wall Street with sophisticated models to explain investment behavior. Long Term Capital, a hedge fund from the 1990’s was held in awe because of two PhD Nobel Prize winning economists on its board. Its first few years showed impressive results and helped it attract billions of dollars of capital. But Long Term Capital made bets on Russian bonds and went from a net worth of billions to bankrupt in a matter of a few months. In typical academic fashion the quants explained that the move on Russian bonds was a ‘25 standard deviation event’, so far outside the realm of a rational model that it could not be predicted.

A 25 standard deviation event is a way of saying the odds of this were as remote as getting hit by a meteor while playing the back nine at Augusta National. It is another way of saying that no rational person could be expected to have foreseen this. This is what happens when theory trumps experience. Our world is filled with the outcomes of ‘25 standard deviation events’.

But these same theories brought down a bigger house of cards only ten years later. Debt pools were assembled that were so complicated that when the underlying assets such as a mass of very crappy mortgages collapsed, the credit markets froze because nobody could figure out what any of these pools were worth. The reason these toxic assets are so hard to clean up is because our brightest accounting and financial minds cannot figure out what they are worth.

We still fail to understand the principles of probability and how our emotions filter and distort our reality. As Nassim Taleb notes in his book by the same name we are “fooled by randomness.”

We can discern the various probabilities of a specific outcome of a roll of a pair of dice, because the universe of outcomes is clearly limited and knowable. The same is true of guessing the chance of any combination of cards from one or multiple decks. Cards and dice are a world on known unknowns.

But making bets on the outcomes in the world of global finance is something wholly different. There is no limit to the combinations and outcome of hundreds of national policies, billions of investors, with millions of financial products, subject to the fears and exuberance brought by wars, inflation, and old fashion human greed. This is the world of infinite possibilities, the world of unknown unknowns. This is a world better served by a philosophical understanding of risk embedded in a world of experience than a delusional faith in theoretical models proposed by credentialed academics.

Yet we have still failed to understand this fundamental reason for our recent credit collapse and we are making the very same mistakes, only this time in the government sector. We still swoon for the sound of intelligence over experience.

A car ‘czar’ brags that he has no experience in the automobile business, but “business is business”. Steve Jobs at Apple was replaced by an executive from the soft drink business; Jobs was brought back- you can now Google the story on your iPhone.

In a subject as massive and as filled with unknown unknowns as global climates we are making bets with familiar delusional certainty and even declaring that the “debate is over”. I may not know which end of the test tube the cork goes into, but I would feel a bit better about reordering our entire economy and social structure based on a fifty year climate prediction if we could predict the weather next week.

Many blame the financial collapse on greed and capitalism, but these flaws have been with us forever.  As Thomas Sowell noted, blaming the financial collapse on greed is like blaming a plane crash on gravity; it is true but not a very useful description.

With some months to now reflect and study the causes of the credit collapse, we cannot hide the central role the government played in the disaster. Had Fannie Mae not guaranteed the crappy mortgages they could not have been assembled into vehicles earning AAA ratings and become acceptable to global investors on such a grand scale. We have been fleeced at the gaming table but the casino owners , the dealers, and the pit boss were all government bureaucrats. They just reserved the high roller tables for Wall Street.

As we watch and hope the government will reform the excess of Wall Street, we should be more concerned who will reform the excesses of government. We should ask how they plan to solve a problem by repeating the very same mistakes that caused it.

From StumblingOnTruth

Keep the Casinos Open
by Clifford S. Asness, Ph.D.

Excerpt:

Stepping back, nowadays the popular narrative is that this economic crisis was caused by Wall Street and derivatives. It was not. It was a real estate bubble caused by government, countless individual people, indeed Wall Street, and a bevy of other economic agents like mortgage and real estate brokers and a government-created oligopoly of underperforming rating agencies. Government was a prime culprit through the creation of disastrous GSEs, implementing politically correct social policy that warped the housing market, enacting land use restrictions in the bubble’s worst epicenters and, of course, promoting 20+ years of too-big-too-fail when it was not at all needed, including pursuing exceptionally easy monetary policy for years after the “dot com” bubble. Individuals contributed mightily through a get-rich-quick mentality (who doesn’t know somebody who quit a real job to flip houses?), over-spending, and short-sightedness. Financial firms of all types clearly pitched in as they tried to ride the bubble until it burst all over them.

Had Wall Street acted more soberly we would still have had a bubble (but maybe a smaller one, which I agree would’ve been better!). But had government not built a bonfire and thrown gasoline on it, I’m not sure we’d have had any problem at all. This can be argued in a circle forever and, admittedly, rational people can disagree how to apportion blame. But, to solely blame Wall Street, as has become the popular narrative, and use that as an excuse to bring yet more of the economy under the federal thumb, is sordid. Government is using a disaster it had a primary role in creating as cover for further takeovers in a cloud of class warfare and lies. That just sounds wrong to me

To review, government, including many of the same legislators who brought us Fannie Mae and took VIP loans from Countrywide, is pinning the full blame for this mess on Wall Street, and concluding we should give government much more power going forward. Its idea of reform is not to commit to ending too-big-to-fail, but to plan for it in perpetuity. Its idea of reform is to give government unspecified but exceptionally puissant abilities to prevent and to fix all problems in the future through bureaucrat-determined arbitrary taxes, open-ended takeover powers, and unprecedented resolution powers that ignore a century of well-developed bankruptcy law (making the corruption carried out in the Chrysler bankruptcy now the law of the land). I’ve exhausted even my ability to be sarcastic here. Please ridicule government amongst yourselves.

In a world of uncertainty it is more important to know the odds than to know the facts.

In a business bet, if you have a thirty percent chance of winning one hundred dollars or a seventy percent chance of winning forty dollars (with return of principal guaranteed) the better bet is the 30% chance.  (30% of $100= $30 vs 70% of $40= $28.) What is pertinent is not just the chance of winning but the pay off or, conversely, the risk.

But risk is rarely known so precisely. In real life decisions risk is a combination of probability plus outrage. This is why we are more concerned with the threat of terrorism than swimming pools, which kill more people.

We all know that there is a chance we will die before our time. That is a known unknown. We can assess what the potential costs of that known unknown is with payroll and investment information, and make a prudent investment in life insurance.

In the financial world (as well as the world of politics, public policy, and foreign affairs) we are faced with unknown unknowns; not only are risks present that we are unaware of but the potential outcome is often unmeasurable.  This uncertainty is multiplied by the global extension of our financial institutions, where matters such as the likelihood of repayment of bond principle and interest is subject to cultural differences, religious tribalism, diplomatic shifts, political frailty, and economic amateurism.

Small banks in Iceland and German villages took large positions in the American mortgage market with poor understanding of the risks, the interconnectedness of financial assets and institutions and with a false sense of security in the professionalism of our financial leaders.  They did not know what they did not know.

Our financial professionals, rational and highly educated, were not immune to this uncertainty and were more blinded than enlightened by their intellect. With complicated mathematical models they deluded themselves with a false sense of certainty; they thought they had considered all the risk factors, but one never knows ALL of the risk factors.  The one risk factor they did miss was a decline in real estate and home prices; it seems obvious only in retrospect. Both regulators and law makers grossly misjudged the risk of the vast interconnectedness of our financial institutions.  What we thought was a market rich with competitors, was really just a giant company with redundant and interconnected divisions.

We valued math when we needed history. We replaced a philosophical understanding of risk with a delusional mathematical certainty.  This emboldened excessive risk taking and leverage, and convinced the financial titans that they had discovered financial alchemy.  The huge profits they enjoyed for a while only convinced them of their own genius, and encouraged them to take even bigger risks.  They thought they could ignore the risks of poor underlying junk assets and convert them into investment grade securities with mortgage backed securities, credit default swaps, and other derivative securities. They thought they could turn tin into gold.

But as John Galbraith noted, “genius is before the fall.” Every bubble in history has been built on delusional certainty, excessive leverage, and the mistaken association of money with intelligence.

This bubble would have been contained were it not for the political and tax policy that inflated the housing market, going back for several decades.  The mortgage tax deduction gives preference to housing over other investments. When Reagan eliminated deductions for consumer interest, it made housing interest even more valuable and equity lines of credit were tapped for boats and vacations.

Franklin Roosevelt opposed the FDIC (Federal deposit Insurance Corporation) because it would penalize prudent banks and encourage excess risk taking.  He capitulated in a compromise in 1934 and it grew from the original $2,500 to the $250,000 we have today. The implied government guarantees of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was  a moral hazard on steroids compared to the FDIC.

The Community Reinvestment Act, championed by Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush (as ‘Compassionate Conservatism’) put these moral hazards to political use and eschewed prudent financial policy to gain political favor. Wall Street thought they could make risk disappear with complex mathematical models; Washington thought they could make risk disappear by pretending they did not exist.

The absurd mark to market rules enforced on the banking system by the government regulators only served to accentuate extremes in market behavior, and could not have been imposed at a worse possible time.

Economics is not a science and the intellectuals and elites who pretend it is keep wreaking havoc.  Though not a science, there are principles that have stood for centuries and are ignored at our own risk.  There is no better teacher of these principles than to watch the results when they are ignored or violated.