by Henry Oliner

While Doug Feith in his excellent, “War and Decision” analyizes what went wrong ( and what went right) in the war on terror, he does not spare his own boss Rumsfeld or Bush. While Rumseld was brilliant at strategy and in depth thinking his personal manner antagonized a lot of people he needed to work with.

The decision to go to war was a thougthful one, with general agreement from both political parties and the advising agencies. Some errors that Feith attributes to Bush:

1. Over reliance on intelligence

Most of the case against Saddam Hussein was in the UN records, the newspapers and the history books. He was clearly circumventing the UN sanctions and weapons inspections and stood ready to continue and restart his WMD productions when the sanctions were lifted. The liklihood of Saddam soon becoming a direct threat was high.

2. Emphasis on WMD stockpiles.

By focusing on the threat of stockpiles during our presentation at the UN, the relative importance of that one factor became the sole measurement and causus belli. Other more important factors were quickly forgotten.

3. Failure to build a cohesive team

Tolerating debate during the planning phase is good. Once the decision for war is made dissenters should leave the group. Toleration of leaks and divisiveness while our troops are under fire and the Iraqis are struggling is intolerable.

Doug retells the Johnson axiom, “It is OK to be on the inside of the tent pissing out, or the outside pissing in; but do not be on the inside of the tent pissing in.”

Bush allowed way too much piss in his tent.

4. Mission creep

The purpose of the mission was to protect the United States from another attack. It was an issue of National Security. When the WMD stockpiles did not materialize, Bush’s speeches shifted to the future of Iraq and building a democracy. He should have re-emphasized the original purpose of protecting America’s security and that it involved much more than the WMD stockpiles.

His shift made it seem we were fighting for Iraqi interests and not American interests and that was the beginning of the end for public support of the war. This was his biggest mistake.

The threat was not diminished by Bush’s communication gaffes, but continuous support to finish the job was jeapordized.

During the fall of Bagdad Doug Feith was watching the famous scene of the toppling statue of Saddam, live on television.

He noticed the US soldier draping an American flag on the head of the fallen statue. He recoiled seeing this as sending the wrong message of the purpose of the American forces. He called General Myers to see if he could reach the soldier and remove it before it permeated the media. Within seconds Feith saw on TV the soldier remove the American flag and replace it with an Iraqi flag.

The General did not reach the soldier that quickly; a fellow soldier realized the gaffe and corrected it before they were ever reached. The soldiers understood why we were there.

The symbolism of such small gestures can have large impacts.

from “War and Decision” by Douglas Feith

Doug Feith’s “War and Decision” tries to set the record straight as he saw it up close about the decision to send troops into Iraq and what went wrong.

There was general agreement between the agencies that Saddam had to go. He was just too much of a potential threat. The decision to invade Iraq was well discussed and the risks associated with the venture were simply outweighed by the risks of leaving him in power. Rarely, however, is credit given for preventing problems as it is bestowed for solving them after the fact.

Then what went wrong?

The breakdown started with conflicts between the agencies involved; State, Defense and the CIA. When would the authority shift from defense to politics? Defense was having problems with the quality of the intelligence from the CIA and it failed on many points besides WMD stockpiles.
The biggest breakdown was the interim government planning. Defense felt it was necessary to get Iraqis in control of their own government as soon as possible; otherwise we would be seen as an occupying force rather than a liberating force. The CIA and State was more afraid of placing control in the hands of the wrong people, and allowing another tyrant to simply replace Saddam. Both sides had merit.

State and the CIA believed it was wrong to let the externals, Iraqi leaders currently living outside the country, take control because they would not seem legitimate to the Iraqis. Yet they felt the internals were not up to the task of governing. Rumsfeld thought that their legitimacy would be determined by their actions in governing and that was for the Iraqis to decide.

A plan for an Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA) was developed by Feith, with the desire and intent to govern until a constitution and and a full election was executed. There were severe squabbles on who would participate; the content of externals and internals, Sunnis and Shias, Christians, women, etc.

While Defense expected the CPA, the Controlling Provisional Authority, the US military rulers, to only be in place for a few months before the IIA took over; State felt that it was necessary for them to control the government for up to two years. This differed greatly from the model that was successful in Afghanistan. To be fair, Iraq had different issues to consider than Afghanistan.
With the decision to keep the CPA active for years the US forces went from being a liberating force to an occupying force.

Paul Bremer, the senior U.S. civilian official acquired a very different perception of the urgency of the IIA than Defense had. Bremer also seriously questioned the readiness and capability of the Iraqis to form and run their own government to a point that it seemed contemptuous.

While they questioned the preceived legitimacy of the externals as a ruling group. it would have been more legitimate than an occupying American controlled government. When the interim government was formed it consisted largely of externals and there were no problems of legitimacy.

At this point many Iraqis were hesitant to step forward. Saddam was still at large and the US commitment was questionable in their experience. This is why the Baathist party was kept from the ruling coalition and why the Army was disbanded, a move criticized by many as a contributing factor to the insurgency. The Iraqi army, however, was too top heavy, corrupt and discriminatory; if it had been allowed to remain in power even in a deflated form, many factions like the Kurds and the Shias would never have trusted the interim or new government.

It is easy to see after the fact that the extended term of the CPA may have been a problem.

For those who accuse the adminstration of not having a post Saddam plan, that is untrue. While the provisional government transition proved problematical, many problems such as refugees, financial stability and environmental were effectively avoided. The problem was the execution of the plan amidst quarelling agencies. Reconciling this conflict should have been given more attention by the President. Any plan would have likely faced challenges of some sort. The military solution to the unknown should apply: improvise- adapt- overcome.

HKO

With little fanfare compared to the tired old “Bush lied; troops died” refrain, we now know that Saddam had stockpiled 550 tons of yellow cake. It has recently been in the news as sold and shipped to a Canadian company.

Clearly our invasion stopped this material from being developed into nuclear fuels and weapons. And the leaks about yellow cake from Niger that was the basis for the Valerie Plame case also indicated that Bush wasn’t lying.

I assume the apologies from his opposition will be soon forthcoming. Obama will now announce that he was wrong for opposing the war and that Hussein (the other one) was clearly retaining his ability to produce nuclear weapons.

From American Thinker

July 06, 2008
President Bush exonerated of ‘misleading statements’ leading to Iraq war
Vincent Gioia

Today we know that Iraq did possess 550 metric tons of “yellowcake” — the seed material for higher-grade nuclear enrichment. The effort to topple Hussein and cause regime change was indeed necessary to prevent the development of nuclear weapons. We know this because it has been revealed, albeit without the fanfare of the earlier “scandal”, that this huge stockpile of concentrated uranium, a remnant of Hussein’ nuclear program, was removed from Iraq and shipped to a buyer in Canada. It should be a great relief to the world to know that Hussein was not given enough time to further develop his nuclear program because President Bush defied his critics and took action to abort this threat.

To those unfamiliar with “yellowcake”, it is a concentrated form of uranium resulting from early stages of uranium ore processing. Although yellowcake is not considered potent enough for a nuclear bomb or for a so-called “dirty bomb” – “a conventional explosive that disperses radioactive material” – it is a very dangerous material in the wrong hands. Yellowcake can be enriched for use in nuclear reactors and, at higher levels, nuclear weapons.

Of course, as was the case with Caesar, “The evil that men do (in the eyes of their critics) live after them but the good is (“oft”) interred with their souls”. Bush continues to be maligned by his liberal and appeasement minded critics and too many Americans as well, for taking preemptive action to cancel this threat. We can only wonder what critics and opponents would say if Saddam Hussein had been allowed to continue and developed a nuclear weapon of mass destruction and made it available to world terrorists; at least those of them who would still be alive following a nuclear terrorist attack in the United States?

The public has accepted several myths about our actions in Afghanistan and Iraq that have been perpetrated by biased and incomplete reporting; often repeating distortions until they are accepted as facts. This problem was magnified by quarelling departments, security leaks, and the administration’s poor job of explaining their policies.

Myth # 1- Our main objective was to capture Osama Bin Laden.

Our main objective was to protect the US from further attacks. This is a critical distinction often lost by those critical of the fact that Bin Laden is still at large even if his organization is largely crushed.

Bush made a major policy change when he treated 9/11 as an act of war rather than a crime, as it had been treated before. The administration clearly understood that even if Bin Laden had been captured or killed within weeks that this success would have been short lived and we would have still been vulnerable to another attack from similarly hostile groups.

It became their policy to remove the supporting infrastructure that allowed these terrorists to train and flourish. This is why it was decided to not just attack Al Qaeda, but to also remove the Taliban that gave them safe haven. This was also why Iraq became a target.

Myth # 2- Stockpiles of WMD’s was the main reason we invaded Iraq.

WMD stockpiles was only one of several cases for removing Saddam. His past history of development and deployment of chemical weapons, his prior attempt at developing nuclear weaponry, his belingerency against Iran, Kuwait, and the Kurds, and his willingness to supply terrorists with these agents all made him the most likely threat. His violation of 16 UN resolutions, his expelling of weapons inspectors, lack of documentation on his weapons, and attacks against U.S. and British planes in the no fly zone all illustrated the threat he posed.

While the CIA did believe he possessed stockpiles of WMD’s, Bush’s greater concern was his retention of capabilities to restart these programs. Saddam had successfully kept the UN and its inspectors at bay, and with dual purpose factories remained able to start chemical and biological weapons production within weeks.

Rumsfeld even listed a contingency before attacking Iraq that WMDs may not be found. Both State and Defense believed that even if that was the case that Iraq posed a large enough threat to merit action.

Powell’s emphasis on stockpiles at his address to the UN instead of capability and willingness to use these weapons proved unfortunate since the absence of the stockpiles quickly tagged the venture a failure.

Myth #3- Bush was warned about the problems of an invasion and ignored advice not to invade.

The agencies had long lists of potential problems; that was part of the planning process. Yet many of the leaders who warned of problems were not suggesting that Saddam be left in power, and the vast majority of them supported his removal.

Myth #4- Bush had plans to get Sadaam even before 9/11.

Simply not true. Given Saddam’s belligerent history Defense had disussed his removal before Bush was ever elected. Leading Democrats had called for his removal in the 1990’s after Saddam threw out the weapons inspectors. Bush even stalled the creation of a post Sadaam transition plan less it be perceived that he had already predetermined his removal and was not seriously giving the inspectors a chance to avoid war.

Myth #5- Rumsfeld filtered the intelligence to fit his preconceived notion and plans.

Not true. Rumsfeld vigorously questioned the intelligence. He was accused of trying to prop up Chalabi who the CIA disliked, but he had only insisted that Chalabi be included among 4 other Iraqi externals as potential leaders and that the Iraqis make the decision who ran their country. When the military had captured Al Qaeda operatives in Iraq, it took the CIA forever to question the captives.

Doug Feith and Rumsfeld felt that the CIA should provide intelligence and not policy, yet it appeared that the CIA was filtering intelligence to fit their notions rather than deliver objective intelligence as they should.

Myth # 6- There was no relationship between Al Qaeda and Saddam.

This was the opinion of the CIA early on; believeing that the secular Saddam would not ally with religious jihadists. Rumsfeld questioned this assumption. Did not the secular Arafat ally with Islamic jihadists? History has seen alliances between the ideologoically incompatable to face a common enemy. What about Germany and Russia, and then the U.S. and Russia?

There was much evidence of Al Qaeda and other terrorist training in Iraq, including captured Al Qaeda operatives. The notion that they were not there until we invaded was not true.

The Iraq Study Group (ISG) reported that there was no “operational relationship”, but this only means that Iraq was not in on the actual plans on 9/11 and that claim was never made by the adminsitration. News coverage of the ISG of course dropped the “operational” adjective, leaving the public believing that there was no ties with Al Qaeda. By the same measure The Taliban did not have an “operational realtionship” with Al Qaeda. Iraq did train and support terrorists, including Al Qaeda; and this combined with their WMD capabilities made them a serious threat.

Myth #7- Bush’s policy was to establish democracy in Iraq

While Bush spoke often about the desirablity of establishing democracies to fight terrorism, his staff fought against the objective of establishing democracy in Iraq. Our objective was to remain to protect the US against further attacks. Rumsfeld in particular argued against the “democracy” objective because it would be too hard to achieve in a short time. They decided to include the establishment of democratic institutions such as courts and the rule of law. Rumsfeld felt that ultimately the people of Iraq should decide what kind of government they wanted.

Myth #8- We needed more troops on the ground but Rumsfeld forced his vision of the military on the commanders and did not listen to their advice otherwise.

Rumsfeld noted that in Operation Desert Storm, removing Iraq from Kuwait, that we sent 500,000 troops and needed far less. In that campaign 90% of the ammo was sent back to the US unopened. He questioned whether such an overwhelming force would be needed in Iraq.

Both Rumsfeld and General Franks felt that an element of surprise was critical. The Iraqis did not expect ground troops so quickly. Franks felt that waiting for a large buildup would have destroyed the critical element of surprise. He succeeded in unseating Saddam even faster than their great success in Afghanistan.

Rumsfeld deffered to his Commanders to determine troop strength.

HKO summary-
While it is certainly unpopular to praise our efforts and although this fight is far from over, once must surmise that the administration did achieve the objective of preventing further attacks. Perhaps the cost was much higher in blood and treasure than expected, but such a change in policy is not easily reversable and the best laid plans morph quickly in combat. Terrorist activity worldwide is down sharply. See previous post.

But then everybody knows that, don’t they?

most information from Doug Feith’s “War and Decision.” Read Doug’s own summary of the decision to invade Iraq in the Wall Street Journal on line, Why We Went to War in Iraq.