The public has accepted several myths about our actions in Afghanistan and Iraq that have been perpetrated by biased and incomplete reporting; often repeating distortions until they are accepted as facts. This problem was magnified by quarelling departments, security leaks, and the administration’s poor job of explaining their policies.

Myth # 1- Our main objective was to capture Osama Bin Laden.

Our main objective was to protect the US from further attacks. This is a critical distinction often lost by those critical of the fact that Bin Laden is still at large even if his organization is largely crushed.

Bush made a major policy change when he treated 9/11 as an act of war rather than a crime, as it had been treated before. The administration clearly understood that even if Bin Laden had been captured or killed within weeks that this success would have been short lived and we would have still been vulnerable to another attack from similarly hostile groups.

It became their policy to remove the supporting infrastructure that allowed these terrorists to train and flourish. This is why it was decided to not just attack Al Qaeda, but to also remove the Taliban that gave them safe haven. This was also why Iraq became a target.

Myth # 2- Stockpiles of WMD’s was the main reason we invaded Iraq.

WMD stockpiles was only one of several cases for removing Saddam. His past history of development and deployment of chemical weapons, his prior attempt at developing nuclear weaponry, his belingerency against Iran, Kuwait, and the Kurds, and his willingness to supply terrorists with these agents all made him the most likely threat. His violation of 16 UN resolutions, his expelling of weapons inspectors, lack of documentation on his weapons, and attacks against U.S. and British planes in the no fly zone all illustrated the threat he posed.

While the CIA did believe he possessed stockpiles of WMD’s, Bush’s greater concern was his retention of capabilities to restart these programs. Saddam had successfully kept the UN and its inspectors at bay, and with dual purpose factories remained able to start chemical and biological weapons production within weeks.

Rumsfeld even listed a contingency before attacking Iraq that WMDs may not be found. Both State and Defense believed that even if that was the case that Iraq posed a large enough threat to merit action.

Powell’s emphasis on stockpiles at his address to the UN instead of capability and willingness to use these weapons proved unfortunate since the absence of the stockpiles quickly tagged the venture a failure.

Myth #3- Bush was warned about the problems of an invasion and ignored advice not to invade.

The agencies had long lists of potential problems; that was part of the planning process. Yet many of the leaders who warned of problems were not suggesting that Saddam be left in power, and the vast majority of them supported his removal.

Myth #4- Bush had plans to get Sadaam even before 9/11.

Simply not true. Given Saddam’s belligerent history Defense had disussed his removal before Bush was ever elected. Leading Democrats had called for his removal in the 1990’s after Saddam threw out the weapons inspectors. Bush even stalled the creation of a post Sadaam transition plan less it be perceived that he had already predetermined his removal and was not seriously giving the inspectors a chance to avoid war.

Myth #5- Rumsfeld filtered the intelligence to fit his preconceived notion and plans.

Not true. Rumsfeld vigorously questioned the intelligence. He was accused of trying to prop up Chalabi who the CIA disliked, but he had only insisted that Chalabi be included among 4 other Iraqi externals as potential leaders and that the Iraqis make the decision who ran their country. When the military had captured Al Qaeda operatives in Iraq, it took the CIA forever to question the captives.

Doug Feith and Rumsfeld felt that the CIA should provide intelligence and not policy, yet it appeared that the CIA was filtering intelligence to fit their notions rather than deliver objective intelligence as they should.

Myth # 6- There was no relationship between Al Qaeda and Saddam.

This was the opinion of the CIA early on; believeing that the secular Saddam would not ally with religious jihadists. Rumsfeld questioned this assumption. Did not the secular Arafat ally with Islamic jihadists? History has seen alliances between the ideologoically incompatable to face a common enemy. What about Germany and Russia, and then the U.S. and Russia?

There was much evidence of Al Qaeda and other terrorist training in Iraq, including captured Al Qaeda operatives. The notion that they were not there until we invaded was not true.

The Iraq Study Group (ISG) reported that there was no “operational relationship”, but this only means that Iraq was not in on the actual plans on 9/11 and that claim was never made by the adminsitration. News coverage of the ISG of course dropped the “operational” adjective, leaving the public believing that there was no ties with Al Qaeda. By the same measure The Taliban did not have an “operational realtionship” with Al Qaeda. Iraq did train and support terrorists, including Al Qaeda; and this combined with their WMD capabilities made them a serious threat.

Myth #7- Bush’s policy was to establish democracy in Iraq

While Bush spoke often about the desirablity of establishing democracies to fight terrorism, his staff fought against the objective of establishing democracy in Iraq. Our objective was to remain to protect the US against further attacks. Rumsfeld in particular argued against the “democracy” objective because it would be too hard to achieve in a short time. They decided to include the establishment of democratic institutions such as courts and the rule of law. Rumsfeld felt that ultimately the people of Iraq should decide what kind of government they wanted.

Myth #8- We needed more troops on the ground but Rumsfeld forced his vision of the military on the commanders and did not listen to their advice otherwise.

Rumsfeld noted that in Operation Desert Storm, removing Iraq from Kuwait, that we sent 500,000 troops and needed far less. In that campaign 90% of the ammo was sent back to the US unopened. He questioned whether such an overwhelming force would be needed in Iraq.

Both Rumsfeld and General Franks felt that an element of surprise was critical. The Iraqis did not expect ground troops so quickly. Franks felt that waiting for a large buildup would have destroyed the critical element of surprise. He succeeded in unseating Saddam even faster than their great success in Afghanistan.

Rumsfeld deffered to his Commanders to determine troop strength.

HKO summary-
While it is certainly unpopular to praise our efforts and although this fight is far from over, once must surmise that the administration did achieve the objective of preventing further attacks. Perhaps the cost was much higher in blood and treasure than expected, but such a change in policy is not easily reversable and the best laid plans morph quickly in combat. Terrorist activity worldwide is down sharply. See previous post.

But then everybody knows that, don’t they?

most information from Doug Feith’s “War and Decision.” Read Doug’s own summary of the decision to invade Iraq in the Wall Street Journal on line, Why We Went to War in Iraq.

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