Doug Feith’s “War and Decision” tries to set the record straight as he saw it up close about the decision to send troops into Iraq and what went wrong.

There was general agreement between the agencies that Saddam had to go. He was just too much of a potential threat. The decision to invade Iraq was well discussed and the risks associated with the venture were simply outweighed by the risks of leaving him in power. Rarely, however, is credit given for preventing problems as it is bestowed for solving them after the fact.

Then what went wrong?

The breakdown started with conflicts between the agencies involved; State, Defense and the CIA. When would the authority shift from defense to politics? Defense was having problems with the quality of the intelligence from the CIA and it failed on many points besides WMD stockpiles.
The biggest breakdown was the interim government planning. Defense felt it was necessary to get Iraqis in control of their own government as soon as possible; otherwise we would be seen as an occupying force rather than a liberating force. The CIA and State was more afraid of placing control in the hands of the wrong people, and allowing another tyrant to simply replace Saddam. Both sides had merit.

State and the CIA believed it was wrong to let the externals, Iraqi leaders currently living outside the country, take control because they would not seem legitimate to the Iraqis. Yet they felt the internals were not up to the task of governing. Rumsfeld thought that their legitimacy would be determined by their actions in governing and that was for the Iraqis to decide.

A plan for an Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA) was developed by Feith, with the desire and intent to govern until a constitution and and a full election was executed. There were severe squabbles on who would participate; the content of externals and internals, Sunnis and Shias, Christians, women, etc.

While Defense expected the CPA, the Controlling Provisional Authority, the US military rulers, to only be in place for a few months before the IIA took over; State felt that it was necessary for them to control the government for up to two years. This differed greatly from the model that was successful in Afghanistan. To be fair, Iraq had different issues to consider than Afghanistan.
With the decision to keep the CPA active for years the US forces went from being a liberating force to an occupying force.

Paul Bremer, the senior U.S. civilian official acquired a very different perception of the urgency of the IIA than Defense had. Bremer also seriously questioned the readiness and capability of the Iraqis to form and run their own government to a point that it seemed contemptuous.

While they questioned the preceived legitimacy of the externals as a ruling group. it would have been more legitimate than an occupying American controlled government. When the interim government was formed it consisted largely of externals and there were no problems of legitimacy.

At this point many Iraqis were hesitant to step forward. Saddam was still at large and the US commitment was questionable in their experience. This is why the Baathist party was kept from the ruling coalition and why the Army was disbanded, a move criticized by many as a contributing factor to the insurgency. The Iraqi army, however, was too top heavy, corrupt and discriminatory; if it had been allowed to remain in power even in a deflated form, many factions like the Kurds and the Shias would never have trusted the interim or new government.

It is easy to see after the fact that the extended term of the CPA may have been a problem.

For those who accuse the adminstration of not having a post Saddam plan, that is untrue. While the provisional government transition proved problematical, many problems such as refugees, financial stability and environmental were effectively avoided. The problem was the execution of the plan amidst quarelling agencies. Reconciling this conflict should have been given more attention by the President. Any plan would have likely faced challenges of some sort. The military solution to the unknown should apply: improvise- adapt- overcome.

HKO

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